







































An unduly neglected implication of the choice of the tax unit is its impact on the
consumption risk carried by taxpayers. As compared to individual taxation, joint taxation
with income splitting provides couples with more insurance against the risk of earning
inability for one of the spouses. If that risk is not insurable in markets, replacing individual
taxation with joint taxation with income splitting can generate a Pareto-improvement.
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1 Introduction
In contrast to single persons, individuals living as a married couple have entered a long-
term comittment to share their resources and support each other. While that commitment
strongly a¤ects social policy legislation, its recognition in income taxation varies across
countries. As a matter of fact, the majority of OECD countries taxes couples on an
individual basis, i.e. husbands income and wifes income are separately taxed according
to the same tax schedule that is used for single persons. Only a few countries apply some
form of joint taxation where a couples tax liability depends on its total income. How
couples should be taxed is a long-standing issue in public economics, and one with many
aspects. The literature has investigated a number of equity and incentive aspects of the
problem. Early papers such as Fraser (1986) pointed out the impossibility of having a
tax system that is directly progressive, has couples with equal income paying equal taxes,
and where no marriage tax or subsidy exists. More recent papers, including Piggott
and Whalley (1996), Gottfried and Richter (1999), Schroyen (2003), Kleven and Kreiner
(2007), Cremer et al. (2007), and Kleven et al. (2009), have analyzed the taxation of
couples incomes in an optimal taxation framework with endogenous labor supply and
home production. A recent overview of the state of the art is o¤ered by Apps and Rees
(2009).
The aim of this note is to put forward consumption risk as an ingredient that should
a¤ect the choice of the tax unit. While the insurance e¤ect from a progressive income tax
has been well known since at least the seminal papers by Eaton and Rosen (1980) and
Varian (1980), the literature on the tax treatment of couples is limited to the analysis of
deterministic settings. That literature thus neglects the implications of di¤erent systems of
household taxation for the consumption risk carried by households. This notes provides
a rst step in that dierction by comparing individual taxation and joint taxation with
income splitting in a simple model where individuals are subject to a non-insurable earning
risk. It is shown that joint taxation with income splitting is superior in the Pareto sense:
given some arbitrary progressive tax schedule, a move from a system of individual taxation
to one of joint taxation with income splitting makes all couples better o¤ ex ante. The
intuition for this result is that joint taxation with income splitting increases the amount of
insurance implicitly o¤ered by the government: as compared to individual taxation, joint
taxation with income splitting eliminates more consumption risk because it generates a
"splitting gain" in case of bad luck for one of the spouses.
Casual observation suggests that the insurance e¤ect at work in the current model may
be highly relevant in practice. Inability to nd a job, failure of own business, necessity to
look after a disabled family member, own physical disability, chronic illness, depression
and other mental disorders are frequent sources of substantial earning risk that cannot
be e¢ ciently insured in markets. While for single persons the risk of insu¢ cient market
income is usually covered by the transfer system, two married persons carry much of that
risk by themselves, as they only receive welfare payments if the sum of their individual
market incomes is deemed insu¢ cient. For a normative assessment of the tax treatment of
couples it is therefore important to understand how the various systems help households
to reduce their consumption risk.1
2 Model
2.1 Assumptions
Consider a total population with mass 2 +  consisting of two identical continua of men
and women, where   0. Both men and women are characterized by their type y which
represents an individuals earnings potential. There is a nite number of types; the lowest
type is denoted by y > 0, the highest by y  y, and the fraction of type-y individuals in
the population is y, where yy = 1. Ex post, each individual may be either in the good
state, where the individual realizes its earning potential and receives a market income
equal to its type, or in the bad state, where no market income is received. Individual
risks are identically and independently distributed and the probability of the bad state
for an individual is denoted by  2 (0; 1).
Individuals are either singles or married persons. The mass of singles is , so that
the remaining individuals form a continuum of unit mass of couples. The fraction of
individuals who stay single is the same for all types and couples consist of a man and a
woman of the same type. This can be interpreted as the stable conguration of a process
of voluntary matching among all individuals who want to get married. In case of marriage,
spouses pool their incomes within the couple and jointly consume their total disposable
income. A couples von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted by U(c), where
c is the couples total disposable income and U 0 > 0 > U 00.
The government raises money by means of a progressive income tax in order to nance
transfers to households without market income and to cover administrative costs. The
income tax schedule T (y) satises T (0) = 0, 0 < T 0 < 1 and T 00 > 0. Two systems of
1According to OECD (2009), only 86 % of men in age between 25 and 54 were in employment (including
part-time) in 2008 in the US. The corresponding number for women is 72.3 %. Numbers for the EU-19
countries are similar. If one assumes that all men in that age group would in principle like to work, the
14 % out of employment give an idea about the magnitude of the earning risk modelled in this note.
If one somewhat heroically assumes that women face the same earning risk as men, the above numbers
suggest that less than half of female unemployment is voluntary.
2
taxation of couples are considered: individual taxation and joint taxation with income
splitting. In case of individual taxation, each spouses income is separately taxed. In
case of joint taxation, the spousesincomes are added together and taxed as if they had
each earned one half of their total income. The two tax systems are compared in terms
of expected utility when the government has to raise the same tax revenue under both
systems. Any di¤erence in the tax revenue generated by T () between the two systems is
assumed to be covered by an additional tax or subsidy such that the nal amount of tax
collected from each type is the same under both systems.
2.2 Budget constraint of government
Because of the law of large numbers, the fraction of singles with zero market income is
given by  and the fraction of couples with zero market income is given by 2. Hence, total
public expenditures is given by R  G + zs + 2zm, where G denotes administration
costs, zs is the transfer to singles with zero earnings, and zm is the transfer to couples
without earnings. Let Ry denote the tax revenue collected from type y. The tax schedule
is such that the government meets its budget constraint, i.e. yRy = R.
Under joint taxation with income splitting, the tax paid by type y is given by
Ry = y[(1  )T (y) + 2(1  )2T (y=2) + (1  )22T (y)]: (1)
The rst term in the square bracket on the r.h.s. represents the tax revenue from single
earners, the second term is tax revenue from couples where only one spouse receives an
income, and the third term refers to two-earners couples.
In case of individual taxation, the tax revenue only depends on the number of individ-
uals with market income, independently of their marriage status. The tax collected from
type y amounts to
Ry = y(1  )(2 + )[T (y)  s(y)]; (2)
where s(y) is the di¤erential taxation which is necessary to equalize the tax revenue under





where V (y) = T (y)   2T (y=2) is the splitting gain under joint taxation for one-earner
couples. Because of progressivity, V (y) > 0 which implies s(y) > 0, i.e. the tax schedule is
higher under joint taxation than under individual taxation. Notice that also the adjusted
tax schedule for individual taxation, T (y) s(y), satises T (0) s(0) = 0, 0 < T 0 s0 < 1
and T 00 + s00 > 0.
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2.3 Welfare comparison
Each couple of a given type can nd itself in three di¤erent states. With probability
(1   )2 the couple is in state 1 where both spouses earn market income and jointly
consume disposable income c1(y). With probability 2(1   ) the couple is in state 2
where only one of the two spouses can earn income and they jointly consume c2(y). With
probability 2 both spouses earn nothing and jointly receive the welfare benet for couples
zm, which determines their consumption level in the third state. Assume that zm < ci(y),
i 2 f1; 2g and normalize the utility function of couples so that U(zm) = 0. Short of a
positive multiplicative factor, a couples expected utility can be expressed as
E[U ] = (1  )U(c1(y)) + 2U(c2(y)): (4)
The following fact can be established:
Proposition 1. For all types, the expected utility of couples is strictly higher under a
system of joint taxation than under a system of individual taxation generating the same
tax revenue.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary type y and proceed in four steps as follows. First,
show that joint taxation e¤ectively reduces the consumption risk of couples. Let cJi and
cIi respectively denote a couples state-contingent consumption under joint taxation and
individual taxation. As the marginal tax rate is less than 100 %, we have c1 > c2 under






2, so that consumption is
less risky under joint taxation. Under individual taxation, cI1 = 2[y   T (y) + s(y)], while
under joint taxation, cJ1 = 2[y   T (y)]. Since s(y) > 0, cJ1 < cI1. If one spouse receives no
market income, cI2 = y   T (y) + s(y) and cJ2 = y   2T (y=2). Thus, one has
cJ2 > c
I
2 , V (y) > s(y):
By (3), the latter inequality always holds true, so that cJ2 > c
I
2.
The second step is to determine the rate r at which consumption in state 1 is trans-
formed into state-2 consumption if joint taxation replaces individual taxation. By def-
inition, r =  (cJ2   cI2)=(cJ1   cI1). Inserting the above expressions for state-contingent
consumption and making use of (3), the rate of transformation can be computed as
r() =
2(1  ) + 
4
: (5)
The third step consists of showing that if  = 0, the consumption shift across states
implied by a move from individual to joint taxation increases expected utility. Total
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Since the indi¤erence curves are strictly convex and cJ1 > c
J
2 , the slope of the indi¤erence
curve at the consumption plan associated with joint taxation has
 dc2
dc1
jc=cJ < 1  2 : (6)
If  = 0, the rate of transformation of state-1 into state-2 consumption is, using (5),




which implies that the consumption plan associated with individual taxation lies on an
indi¤erence curve strictly below the one cutting through (cJ1 ; c
J
2 ). This shows that couples
strictly prefer joint taxation if  = 0.
Finally, it must be shown that also if  > 0 couples prefer joint taxation over individual
taxation. This can be seen from the e¤ect of  on the di¤erential tax s(y). By (3),
the consumption level of couples is a strictly decreasing function of  under individual
taxation, while it is una¤ected by  under joint taxation. Since joint taxation makes
couples better o¤ if  = 0, a fortiori the same is true if  > 0. 
Notice that if  = 0 there are no singles in the population and a reform from individual
to joint taxation generates a strict Pareto improvement.
2.4 Example with proportional tax adjustment
The following example exhibits a class of progressive tax schedules for which a Pareto-
improving tax reform can be obtained by imposing an additional proportional income
tax. That is, a uniform increase of the marginal tax rate is su¢ cient to make all couples
better o¤ when replacing individual taxation with joint taxation with income splitting.
Equivalently, the government may keep the same income tax schedule, raise a consumption
tax, and adjust welfare payments so that the consumption of the poor is una¤ected in
real terms.
Proposition 2. Let T = a[y ln(by)   y], where y 2 [y=2; y], 0 < a < 1, b  2e=y.
Switching from individual taxation to joint taxation with income splitting and imposing
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makes all couples better o¤.
Proof. It directly follows from computing V (y) = ay ln 2, inserting it into (3), and
applying Proposition 1. 
3 Concluding remark
As compared to individual taxation, joint taxation with income splitting provides couples
with more insurance against the risk of earning inability for one of the spouses. Under
risk aversion and exogenous incomes, this additional insurance makes couples better o¤
ex ante. This result has been obtained in a model where incentive issues are absent.
Under endogenous incomes that additional insurance is bound to generate incentive e¤ects
a¤ecting labor supply, home production, and risk-taking. A comprehensive analysis of the
welfare e¤ects from the tax treatment of couples should surely take both uncertainty and
incentives into account.2
2Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) review and extend the analysis of labor supply under risk.
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